3-19. The Persian Expedition

Here but the briefest outline can be given of the oft-told tale of Julian's Persian expedition. Before it criticism sinks powerless, for it is a wonder-story and we cannot solve its riddle. The leader perished and the rest is silence: with him was lost the secret of his hopes. Julian left Antioch on 5 March 363 and on the 9th reached Hierapolis. Here the army had been concentrated and four days later the Emperor advanced at its head, crossed the Euphrates and passing through Batnae halted at Charrae. The name must have awakened gloomy memories and the Emperor's mind was troubled with premonitions of disaster; men said that he had bidden his kinsman Procopius mount the throne should he himself fall in the campaign. A troop of Persian horse had just burst plundering across the frontier and returned laden with booty; this event led Julian to disclose his plan of campaign. Corn had been stored along the road towards the Tigris, in order to create an impression that he had chosen that line for his advance; in fact the Emperor had determined to follow the Euphrates and strike for Ctesiphon. He would thus be supported by his fleet bearing supplies and engines of war. Procopius and Sebastianus he entrusted with 30,000 troops — almost half his army — and directed them to march towards the Tigris. They were for the present to act only on the defensive, shielding the eastern provinces from invasion and guarding his own forces from any Persian attack from the north. When he himself was once at grips with Perbia in the heart of the enemy's territory, Sapor would be forced to concentrate his armies, and then, the presence of Julian's generals being no longer necessary to protect Mesopotamia, should a favourable opportunity offer, they were to act in concert with Arsaces, ravage Chiliocomum, a fertile district of Media, and advance through Corduene and Moxoene to join him in Assyria.

That meeting never took place : from whatever reason Procopius and Sebastianus never left Mesopotamia. Julian reviewed the united forces — 65,000 men — and then turned south following the course of the Bellas (Belecha) until he reached Callinicum (Ar-Rakka) on 27 March. Another day's march brought him to the Euphrates, and here he met the fleet under the command of the tribune Constantianus and the Count Lucillianus. Fifty warships, an equal number of boats designed to form pontoon bridges, and a thousand transports — the Roman armada seemed to an eyewitness fitly planned to match the magnificent stream on which it floated. Another 98 miles brought the army to Diocletian's bulwark fortress of Circesium (Karkisiya) Here the Aboras (Khabur) formed the frontier line; Julian harangued the troops, then crossed the river by a bridge of boats and began his march through Persian territory.

In spite of omens and disregarding the gloomy auguries of the Etruscan soothsayers, the Emperor set his face for Ctesiphon; he would storm high Heaven by violence and bend the gods to his will. From its formation the invading army was made to appear a countless host, for their marching column extended over some ten miles, while neither the fleet nor the land forces were suffered to lose touch with each other. Some of the enemy's forts capitulated, the inhabitants of Anatha being transported to Chalcis in Syria, some were found deserted, while the garrisons of others refusing to surrender professed themselves willing to abide by the issue of the war, Julian was content to accept these terms and continued his unresting advance.

Historians have blamed this rash confidence, whereby he endangered his own retreat. It is however to be remembered that a siege in the fourth century might mean a delay of many weeks, that the Emperor's project was clearly to dismay Persia by the rapidity of his onset and that it would seem probable that his plan, of campaign had been from the first to return by the Tigris and not by the Euphrates. The Persians had intended a year or two before to leave walled cities untouched and strike for Syria, Julian in his turn refused to waste precious time in investing the enemy's strongholds, but would deal a blow against the capital itself. The march was attended with many difficulties : a storm swept down upon the camp, the swollen, river burst its dams and many transports were sunk, the passage of the Narraga was only forced by a successful attack on the Persian rear which compelled them to evacuate their position in confusion, a mutinous and discontented spirit was shown by the Roman troops and the Emperor was forced to exert his personal influence and authority before discipline was restored; finally the Persians raised all the sluices and, freeing the waters, turned the country which lay before the army into a widespread marsh.

Difficulties however vanished before the resource and promptitude of the Emperor, and the advance guard under Victor brought him news that the country up to the walls of Ctesiphon was clear of the enemy. On the fall of the strong fortress of Maiozamalcha, the fleet followed the Naharmalcha (the great canal which united Euphrates and Tigris), while the army kept pace with it on land. The Naharmalcha, however, flows into the Tigris three miles below Ctesiphon, and thus the Emperor would have been forced to propel his ships up stream in his attack on the capital. The difficulty was overcome by clearing the disused canal of Trajan, down which the fleet emerged into the Tigris to the north of Ctesiphon. From the triangle thus formed by the Naharmalcha, the Tigris, and the canal of Trajan, Julian undertook the capture of the left bank of the river. Protected by a palisade, the Persians offered a stubborn resistance to the Roman night attack. The five ships first despatched were repulsed and set on fire ; on the moment "it is the signal that our men hold the bank," cried the Emperor, and the whole fleet dashed to their comrades' support.

Julian's inspiration won a field of battle for the Romans. Underneath a scorching sun the armies fought until the Persians — elephants, cavalry, and foot — were fleeing pell-mell for the shelter of the city walls ; their dead numbered some 2,500. Had the pursuit been pressed, Ctesiphon might perhaps have been won that day, but plunder and booty held the victors fast. Should the capital be besieged or the march against Sapor begun? It would almost seem that Julian himself wavered irresolute, while precious days were lost. Secret proposals of peace led him to underestimate the enemy's strength, while men, playing the part of deserters, offered to lead him through fertile districts against the main Persian army. Should he weary his forces and damp the spirit of his men by an arduous siege, he might not only be cut off from the reinforcements under Procopius and Sebastianus, but might find himself caught between two fires — Sapor's advance and the resistance of the garrison.

To conclude a peace were unworthy of one who took Alexander for his model — better with his victorious troops to strike a final and conclusive blow, and possibly before the encounter effect a junction with the northern army. Crews numerous enough to propel his fleet against the stream he could not spare, and if he were to meet Sapor, he might be drawn too far from the river to act in concert with his ship : they must not fall into the enemy's hands, and therefore they must be burned. The resolution was taken and regretted too late; twelve small boats alone were rescued from the flames. Julian's plans miscarried, for the army of the north remained inactive, perhaps through the mutual jealousy of its commanders, and Axsaces withheld his support from the foe of Sapor.

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